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Abstract: From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit
the global mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The
Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat cli-
mate change over time. Within this process, commitments heavily depend on what has
been already achieved and this status-quo reflects an important reference point serving
either as commitment advice or potential threat. We present an experimental study
that is specifically designed to incorporate the effect of a status-quo via pre-existing
contribution levels under endowment heterogeneity in a game in which participants
make voluntary contributions to a public good. Our participants are sampled from the
United Nations Youth Associations Network, representing participants from 51 coun-
tries. Members from developed and developing countries take decisions against the
background of different initial levels of endowments and pre-existing contributions.
Our analysis indicates that starting with ambitious pre-existing contribution levels can
foster aggregate mitigation levels. Falling behind this status-quo contribution levels by
reducing the public good appears to be a strong behavioral barrier. These observations
might provide support for the basic structure of the Paris Agreement with Nationally
Determined Contributions and the possibility to adjust them, even if a downward re-
vision of national targets may not be precluded.
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1 Introduction
During the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in 2015 and its res-
ulting Paris Agreement 195 countries agreed to set out a global action plan to avoid
dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial level. The agreement is based on “bottom-up” Nationally Determined Con-
tributions (NDCs) being voluntarily imposed, not legally binding and, finally, not en-
forceable.1
Recent assessments evaluating the effects of current mitigation policies raise doubts
that countries are on track to meet the globally agreed target (UNFCCC 2015b). Con-
sequently, as formulated already in Article 3 of the Paris Agreement, “[t]he efforts of
all Parties will present a progression over time [. . . ]” (UNFCCC 2015a) to ratcheting-up
and crank up ambition over time. As a dynamic review mechanism, the global stock-
take will assess the achievements of parties under the Agreement and its long-term
goals every five years, starting in 2023 (Article 14).2
That is, countries will review, compare and potentially adjust their efforts periodically
during the stocktake. In that respect, Article 4.11 states “A Party may at any time ad-
just its existing [NDC] with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, [. . . ]”. It shows
that parties are not required to stick to a particular NDC once submitted but may re-
place existing policies with alternative approaches. The important point is that while
a downward revision of existing NDCs is very likely to provoke stark criticism of the
international community, in principal it remains a legally available option under the
Paris Agreement (C2ES 2017). Countries’ future commitments will therefore depend
on their individual assessment of what has been already achieved, both by themselves
and the other countries. The status-quo of already achieved emission reductions, may
serve as a typical reference point and therefore provide a strong anchor serving either
as a commitment advice for strengthening ambition or may be considered as a poten-
tial threat to reverse actions being already undertaken by the respective country. In
fact, again, while countries are encouraged to increase their ambitions in the stock-
take, an adjustment of the NDCs to less ambitious emission reduction targets may also
be possible. The decision of the current US government to withdraw from the Paris
1As one core element of the Agreement, parties are encouraged to submit individual pledges for
achieving substantial emission reductions at the national level to make efforts transparent and com-
parable. However, there is scepticism whether countries will deviate from their sovereign commit-
ments (e.g., Barrett and Dannenberg 2016).
2Parties agreed on the global stocktake as central review mechanism to access collective progress to-
wards the globally agreed target. The global stocktake should provide countries with the information
for strengthening their ambitions and submitting new NDCs in the two years following the stock-
take. 2018 is the first time to take stock of international efforts, and use the assessment to inform more
ambitious NDCs by 2020. This will be followed with a global stocktake every five years (Article 14).
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Agreement and to reverse policies being initiated by the previous government serves
as an example for the latter case. The question is then: Ratchet up or down in the
stocktake?
To address this question we experimentally investigate the impact of the status-quo
on future climate actions with the possibility of increasing and decreasing ambition
levels under wealth heterogeneity, i.e., poor and rich countries, in the negotiations. Our
experimental design builds upon the canonical public good games (e.g., Ledyard 1995;
Chaudhuri 2011) to capture the tension between the individual interest to free ride
on contributions of other group members and the joint interest to provide the public
good, i.e., the global mitigation target, at a social optimal level. We thereby focus on
individuals’ pre-existing climate mitigation actions being implemented exogenously.
To capture the effect of the status-quo, participants in our experiment choose their
actions against the backdrop of these pre-existing mitigation efforts.
Previous experimental studies devoted to the global climate tragedy account for pre-
existing efforts by restricting the choice of players in a way that they can only add on
top what has been already achieved (e.g., Milinski et al. 2008; Tavoni et al. 2011; Barrett
and Dannenberg 2012; 2014). By contrast, our experimental design allows both for in-
creasing and decreasing ambition levels compared to the status-quo, most importantly
players can undo existing efforts by taking pre-existing contributions from the public
good. In case decisions are mutually exclusive (i.e., either only give or only take from
the status quo), some studies find that such status-quo framing matters (e.g., Andreoni
1995; Park 2000; Khadjavi and Lange 2015; Gächter et al. 2017), while other do not ob-
serve that it changes behavior (e.g., van Dijk and Wilke 1997; Sell and Son 1997; Cubitt
et al. 2011; Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Cox et al. 2013). A recent such study by Gächter
et al. (2017) reveals that differences between giving and taking frames are associated
with a decrease in reciprocity in take decisions and the mixed results can be traced
back to individual differences in attitudes and beliefs. In a setting where the status-
quo is chosen to allows for both, ratcheting up and down pre-existing contributions,
van Soest et al. (2016) find that cooperation collapses where participants can give and
take compared to a pure giving frame, while Khadjavi and Lange (2015) do not ob-
serve differences. However, all these studies do not address heterogeneities between
parties, a crucial feature and a major source of ongoing controversies in climate change
negotiations.
In our experiment we take into account differences in wealth and we divide parti-
cipants into two groups to reflect the persisting dichotomy between rich (“Annex-I”)
and poor (“Non-Annex-I”) countries in current international climate policy.3 Even
3We are aware of one public good experiment with heterogeneous players extending the strategy set
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though the Paris Agreement tries to avoid this bilateral structure, it continues to be
of crucial importance to climate change negotiations (Tørstad and Sælen 2017). Build-
ing up on the reference point in a setting with an intermediate public good provision
level compared to the standard giving setting with no taking option our experimental
design thereby provides a more differentiated view on a potential contribution norm
or burden sharing mechanism. Pre-existing provision levels thereby may either serve
as a coordination advice (since they might suggest a focal point for a possible contribu-
tion norm) or as a potential threat if parties undo climate action already implemented
in the past, e.g., if they fear that other group members will contribute too little.
Another novelty of our study is that we investigate the impact of the status-quo on
future climate actions for the case of poor and rich players, thereby capturing the in-
ternational dimension of global public goods (e.g., Barrett 2007) by collaborating with
the United Nations Youth Associations Network (UNYANET). We recruited 139 indi-
viduals from 51 different countries. Wealth heterogeneity was implemented such that
group members from a developing country start with a lower endowment than mem-
bers from developed countries.4
Our results reveal that starting with pre-existing public goods provision level and al-
lowing both for giving and taking decreases contributions (i.e., additional efforts bey-
ond the status-quo) compared to the standard giving frame. We find that both poor and
rich agents contribute around 30% of their disposable endowment to the public good in
both settings. However, reducing pre-existing contributions by taking out of the group
account appears to be a strong behavioral barrier for the vast majority of participants.
Consequently, in our setting, public goods provision is higher when starting with a
pre-determined contribution level compared to a pure giving frame. While our ex-
perimental results cannot be generalized and inform directly on international climate
negotiations, we provide the important insight that the mere existence of status-quo
plays an important role for cooperation: The majority of individuals tend to abstain
from exploiting or reversing existing public goods provision if they have the oppor-
to taking (see McCarter et al. 2011). In case participants differ with respect to wealth, it is shown
that high endowed subjects are more likely to give to the public good, while low endowed subjects
are more likely to take from the public good. While this study provides valuable first insights, the
experiment does not include pure giving frame and, therefore, does not allow comparing potential
differences in efficiency levels between these two different institutions.
4One might argue that rather the personal wealth status rather than the wealth status of the respective
home country matters for the individual contribution decision in the public goods game. Since del-
egates in real negotiations typically are expected to represent their countries‘ views rather than their
personal interests, we are confident that assigning players into the different roles based on the eco-
nomic circumstances of their home country instead of considering personal wealth or income status
provides a proper way given to address our research question. Moreover, we control for the per-
sonal wealth status in our regression analysis without finding any significant impact of the personal
income on the outcome variables.
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tunity to do so. These observations might provide support for the basic structure of
the Paris Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to
adjust them, even if a downward revision of national targets might not be precluded.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experi-
mental design and procedure of the study. Results are presented in Section 3. A con-
cluding discussion is provided in Section 4.
2 Experimental design and procedure
Our experiment is built upon a standard 4-player public good game. For implement-
ing the status-quo with pre-existing contributions we adopt the design developed by
Khadjavi and Lange (2015) for the case of poor and rich parties. We distinguish between
two treatment conditions: A pure giving condition (GIVE) without any pre-existing
contributions and a condition allowing both for giving and taking of pre-existing ef-
forts (GITA). In both conditions, each group consists of two poor and rich agents. Rich
agents receive an initial endowment of 30 tokens tokens, while poor agents receive an
initial endowment of 10 tokens. In the public goods game every player has to decide
how many tokens to keep for herself and how many tokens to contribute to the group
account, reflecting the group climate change mitigation efforts. Each player earns 0.4
token for each token invested in the group account, regardless of whether she con-
tributed to the group account. Under these parameters, it is in individuals’ material
self-interest to keep the entire endowment in their private account, however, from the
group’s perspective, it is socially optimal if the entire endowment of all group mem-
bers is invested into the public account.
The only difference between GIVE and GITA is that in the first case the entire endow-
ment is initially assigned to the individuals, and hence the status-quo public good
provision is zero. By contrast, in GITA, 40% of the endowment (i.e., 12 tokens and
4 tokens for the rich and poor players, respectively) is initially allocated to the public
good. Hence, in this treatment the status-quo of contributions is 40% of the individual
initial endowment and players have the opportunity to increase contributions to the
public good beyond the status-quo, to maintain the current levels, or even to undo
efforts by taking existing contributions (i.e., up to 40% of their individual initial en-
dowment) out of the public account.
Given our parameters and assuming standard preferences, the unique Nash equilib-
rium in dominant strategies is identical in both treatments: Zero public good provi-
sion.In GIVE players should give nothing to the public good and, accordingly, in GITA
agents are expected to undo existing efforts by taking all contributions out of the group
4
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account.5
To capture the international dimension of the global climate tragedy we conducted
the experiment in collaboration with the United Nations Youth Associations Network
(UNYANET).6 The aim of UNYANET is to strengthen the collaboration between its
members, the UN and further international organizations, e.g., by organizing Model
United Nation (MUNs) sessions. Individual members of the UNYANET network were
contacted by the national organizations via email, inviting them to take part in a sci-
entific study on individual decision making conducted in collaboration with UNYANET.
The email was distributed via UNYANET‘s official communication network. Parti-
cipants were informed that they could earn an additional individual earning depend-
ing on their decisions and the decisions of their peers. In addition, participants knew
that UNYANET receives a show-up fee of 2 US-Dollars for each participant. Subjects
were informed that 10 percent of all participants were randomly selected after the ex-
periment to receive their payment. We did not disclose any further information of the
context or the aim of the experiment at this stage of the study.
As a first step, UNYANET members who followed the link in the invitation email had
to complete an online registration in order to being able to participate in the experi-
ment. During the registration phase, participants had to provide socio-demographic
information (age, sex, income, education, religion, nationality, and residence). This
information was required to assign high and low endowments to participants from de-
veloped and developing countries, respectively.7 After the registration, participants re-
ceived an individual email with a unique access code and could take part in the online
experiment.8 Conducting the experiment via the internet offers obvious advantages
for our study (e.g., Eckel and Wilson 2006; Horton et al. 2011). Most importantly, us-
ing the internet enables us conducting the experiment synchronously at different sites
what provides the opportunity of comparing individual decisions across regions and
countries.9
In total, 139 UNYANET members from 51 countries followed our invitation and took
part in our online experiment. Figure 1 shows the distribution of participants accord-
5Experimental details are provided in the Appendix.
6UNYANET is the international umbrella organization of the United Nations (UN) Youth and Students
associations with members from Europe, Asia, Africa and America. It was founded in 2011 and is
seated in Geneva, Switzerland. For further information, see http://unyanet.org/.
7In particular, the classification into developed and developing countries is done using the Human
Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines life expectancy, education, and per capita income
indicators to rank countries according to their human development. Countries with a HDI of 0.7 and
above are considered as countries with a high or very human development. Countries a HDI below
0.7 are considered to have a medium or low development.
8This procedure ensured that each participants could take part only once in the study.
9We provide the instructions in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Subject pool by country and Human Development Index
Human Development Index :
less than 0.4
0.4 – 0.5
0.5 – 0.6
0.6 – 0.7
0.7 – 0.8
0.8 – 0.9
more than 0.9
Afghanistan(7), Albania(1), Austria(18), Bahrain(1), Belgium(2), Bhutan(1), Bulgaria(1), Cameroon(1), China(1), Colombia(2), 
   Croatia(1), Czech Republic(1), Ethiopia(2), Finland(1), France(2), Gambia(7), Germany(16), Greece(1), Hungary(2),  
     India(1), Indonesia(1), Kazakhstan(3),  Kenya(2), Kyrgyzstan(2), Macedonia(2), Mongolia(1), Montenegro(1), 
      Nepal(2), Netherlands(1), Nigeria(4), Norway(1), Peru(1), Philippines(1), Poland(1), Romania(6), 
      Serbia(7), Slovenia(3), Somalia(6), South Africa(1), Sweden(2), Switzerland(5), 
      Syrian Arab Republic(1), Tajikistan(2), Tanzania(1), Turkey(1), Turkmenistan(1), 
      Uganda(2), Ukraine(3), United Kingdom(1), United States(3), Uzbekistan(2)
ing to countries and the respective economic development. Before entering their alloc-
ation decision, individuals were guided through detailed instructions on the proced-
ure, and a set of numerical examples. We use an ex-post protocol to match participants
into groups of four players and to calculate group contribution levels and payoffs.10
The average payment for the selected participants was a purchasing power equivalent
to $25 in the respective countries. After the allocation decision, we asked participants
to answer questions thereby eliciting their attitudes, e.g., towards trust and climate
change.
The characteristics of participants from developed and developing countries are dis-
played in Table 1. In both samples the average age is 25, and around 50% are students
(no significant differences between the samples). However, the share of female par-
ticipants is lower in developing countries than in developed countries (36% vs. 53%,
p-value: 0.057, Chi-squared test). In addition, participants from developed countries
are more likely to define themselves as belonging to a lower income group within
their home countries than participants from developed countries (2.86 vs. 3.48, p-
10Groups always consist of two poor participants from developing countries and two rich participants
from developed countries. Since our sample does not consist of participants from developing (50)
and developed (89) countries in equal parts, we have re-matched participants from developed coun-
tries to determine payoffs for all participants. Participants, also those who have been re-matched,
have been paid once. For re-matched participants it was randomly determined which group levels
have been considered to calculate payoffs.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Developed
countries
Developing
countries
Participants (in #) 89 50
Age (in years) 25.6 25.9
Female (in %) 52.8 36.0
Student (in %) 57.3 48.0
Income (category) 2.86 3.48
City (category) 3.1 2.82
Trust (in %) 47.1 20.0
Importance of climate
protection (category)
4.53 4.88
Note: "Age" (in years); "Female" (female dummy) "Student" (student dummy); "Income": 1 indicates the
lowest and 5 the highest income group in the participant’s country, based on self-assessment; "City":
grew up in big city (1) to rural village (4); "Trust": % of indicating “Most people can be trusted”; "Im-
portance of climate change protection": importance of fighting climate change: not important (1) to very
important (5).
value 0.000, Mann–Whitney U test). As to personal attitudes, we find a a consider-
able higher trust level (47% vs. 20%, p-value: 0.002, Chi-squared test) for participants
from developed countries than for participants from developed countries (47% of the
participants from developed countries agree with the statement that "most people can
be trusted", but only 20% of all participants from developing countries). Moreover,
it appears that participants from developing countries assign a higher weight for the
need to fight climate change than participants from developed countries (4.53 vs. 4.88,
p-value: 0.004, Mann–Whitney U test). We take these individual characteristics and
differences between the two subsamples, which might affect decision behavior, into ac-
count by adding them as explanatory variables within our regression analysis provided
in the following section.
3 Results
Figure 2 shows our results for individual contributions (i.e., efforts beyond the status-
quo) and individual provision levels (i.e., including both the status-quo and individual
contributions) across treatment conditions.11 We find that average individual contribu-
tions in GITA (4.6 tokens) fall below those in GIVE (7.0 tokens). Regression analyses of
11Detailed summary statistics are provided in Table 3 in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Individual contributions and provision level across treatments and types of
players
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
GITA 
poor
GIVE 
poor
GITA 
rich
GIVE 
rich
GITA 
all
GIVE 
all
1.8
3.6
6.2
8.9
4.6
7
2
3
4
7
3
5
Individual contributions
in Tokens
mean
median
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
5.8
3.6
18.2
8.9
13.8
7
6
3
16
7
14
5
Individual provisions
in Tokens
Note: Individual contributions (i.e., efforts beyond the status-quo) to the public good (left) and provision
levels (i.e., including both the status-quo and individual contributions) (right) in absolute terms across
treatments (GIVE vs. GITA) aggregated for both types of players (all) as well as separately for rich
and poor players. The horizontal lines show the range of individual contributions (provision) from the
minimum to the maximum. Outliers are presented separately. The ends of the “box” indicate the lower
and upper values of the interquartile range, i.e., the middle 50 percent of the variable.
the data show that these differences are significant (Table 2 – column 1, p-value: 0.024).
While participants contribute less in GITA, the vast majority abstains from undoing
pre-existing contribution levels. Only 10% takes out of the public good which suggests
that falling behind the status-quo appears to provoke a strong behavioral barrier in
our experiment. Further evidence for this argument can be found by focusing on full
free-riding behavior. In GITA not a single individual fully free-rides. In GIVE, 4.4% of
all participants act purely selfishly (i.e., zero contributions) (4.35% vs. 0.00%, p-value:
0.120, Fisher’s exact). By looking at the relative contributions (i.e., % of disposable en-
dowment) we find that participants contribute, on average, around one third of their
disposable endowment to the climate account in both treatments GIVE and GITA (32%
in GITA vs. 33% in GIVE, p-value: 0.985, Mann-Whitney U test).
We now analyse the behavior of rich and poor players separately. Average contributions
from rich players in GITA (6.2 tokens) fall below that in GIVE (8.9 tokens) (p-value:
0.071, Table 2 – column 2). Only 6.7% of the rich participants reduce existing climate
mitigation efforts. In this line, neither the share of contributors (91.1% vs. 93.2%, p-
value: 0.513, Fisher’s exact) nor the share of participants choosing the most selfish
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option (0% vs. 6.8%, p-value: 0.117, Fisher’s exact) differs significantly between GITA
and GIVE. Poor participants decide to transfer only about half of the amount in GITA
than in GIVE (1.8 vs. 3.6, p-value: 0.003, Table 2 – column 2). But also for them, the
possibility to fall behind the pre-existing contribution level appears to be a strong be-
havioral barrier. 16% of the poor participants decide to undo pre-existing contribution
levels. Neither the share of givers (100% vs. 84.0%, p-value: 0.110, Fisher’s exact) nor
the share of strong free riders (0% vs. 0%) differ significantly across treatments for poor
agents. Comparing the absolute reductions in individual contributions for both types
between GITA and GIVE (rich: -1.9 vs. poor: -2.6) does not reveal any significant differ-
ences in our sample (captured by interaction term GITA x Poor, p-value 0.739, Table 2
– column 2). There is statistical evidence that higher trust levels increases giving, but
this holds only for rich players (p-value: 0.001, Table 2 – column 3). The remaining
control variables (age, female, student, income and city) do not significantly affect our
results.
Even though GITA reduces individual contributions compared to GIVE (4.6 vs. 7.0,
Table 2 – column 1, p-value: 0.024), average individual provision levels (i.e., including
both the status-quo and individual contributions) in GITA are about as twice as high
as in GIVE (13.8 vs.7.0, p-value: 0.000, Table 2 – column 4; Figure 2 – right-hand side).
As discussed, participants in GITA hardly reduce the status-quo contributions. More
precisely, in GIVE and in GITA rich (30% vs. 35%, p-value 0.406, Mann-Whitney U
test) and poor (29% vs. 36%, p-value 0.411, Mann-Whitney U test) players contribute
on average around 30% of the disposable income to the public good. That is, rich and
poor players benefit from pre-existing contribution levels: Individual provision levels
both for rich players (18.2 vs. 8.9, p-value 0.000, Table 2 –column 5) and poor players
(5.8 vs. 3.6, p-value 0.000, Table 2 – column 5) are higher in GITA than in GIVE.
The private provision of public goods among heterogeneous agents always raises is-
sues on a fair burden sharing, i.e., who should bear the costs of providing the pub-
lic good? We now compare provision at the group level (see Figure 3). Groups in
GIVE contribute on average 25 tokens to the public good. The two poor players per
group contribute together 7 tokens and the two rich players contribute 18 tokens. Con-
sequently, nearly 28% of all contributions are provided by poor participants and the
remaining 72% by their rich partners which shows that participants coordinate on an
equalizing redistribution that offsets the initial differences in endowments. This trend
is even more pronounced in GITA, where two rich players contribute 12 tokens to the
public good and the two poor players contribute 4 tokens. Taking into account the
status-quo level (8 tokens for the poor and 24 tokens for the rich players), the overall
provision level increases to 48 tokens per group. Therefore, 75% of the total public
9
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Table 2: Determinants of individual contribution and provision levels
Individual
contribution levels
Individual
provision levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GITA -2.33**
(1.02)
2.62*
(1.44)
-2.742*
(1.51)
6.81***
(1.22)
9.38***
(1.44)
9.26***
(1.51)
Poor -5.22***
(1.23)
-4.02*
(2.14)
-5.22***
(1.23)
-4.02*
(2.14)
GITA x Poor 0.74
(1.57)
1.54
(1.65)
-7.26***
(1.57)
-6.46***
(1.65)
Trust 5.31***
(1.60)
5.31***
(1.60)
Trust x Poor -5.11***
(1.73)
-5.11***
(1.73)
Climate 0.11
(1.04)
0.11
(1.04)
Climate x Poor 0.08
(1.35)
0.08
(1.35)
Age 0.04
(0.12)
0.04
(0.12)
Female -0.39
(1.02)
-0.39
(1.02)
Student -0.50
(1.29)
-0.50
(1.29)
Income -0.87
(0.63)
-0.87
(0.63)
City 0.36
(0.49)
0.36
(0.49)
Constant 6.97***
(0.801)
8.86***
(1.14)
7.71
(4.76)
6.97***
(0.80)
8.86***
(1.14)
7.71
(4.76)
R-squared 0.037 0.184 0.334 0.184 0.520 0.603
AIC 895.234 887.155 768.232 945.941 876.155 768.234
Observations 139 139 122 139 139 122
Note: OLS regressions, with robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
Dependent variable are participants’ individual contribution to the public good in Model (1) – (3) and
the corresponding provision level in Model (4) – (6).
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Figure 3: Public good provision at group level by treatments and types of players
1 square = 1 token
1 square = 1 token
poor - private account
poor - public account
rich - public account
rich - private account
poor - private account
poor - public account 
poor - status-quo
rich - status-quo
rich - public account
rich - private account
GIVE
GITA
Note: Each square corresponds to one token contributed to the public good on average per group in
GIVE (GITA) on top (below). Squares are highlighted in different colors for different participants (poor
participants from developed countries vs. rich participants from developing countries). In GITA, also
initial contribution levels are highlighted separately.
good level is provided by the rich agents. This is remarkable since rich players’ status-
quo contribution was already three times higher compared to the poor players’ levels.
We thus find that an institutional design which builds up on pre-existing provision
levels characterizing the status quo– even though the taking option fully ensures co-
operation to be voluntarily – generates higher benefits than a pure giving frame even
if players differ with respect to their initial wealth.
4 Summary and concluding remarks
The Paris Agreement arguably gives new hope to climate change negotiations (e.g.,
Bodansky 2016) but from a current perspective, it seems insufficiently ambitious to
limit the global mean temperature increase to 2°C (UNFCCC 2015b). According to
Article 3 of the Agreement, the global efforts to combat climate change at a dangerous
level will present a progression over time. As a dynamic mechanism to review the
voluntarily implemented NDCs of the different Parties, the global stocktake will as-
11
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sess the achievements of the international community every five years, starting in 2023
(Article 14). As countries will review, compare and potentially adjust their efforts peri-
odically during this process, their future commitments will depend on what has been
already achieved. This status-quo reflects an important reference point serving either
as a commitment advice for strengthening the ambition or even revising it downwards.
We experimentally investigate the impact of the status-quo on future climate actions
in a stylized negotiation setting reflecting the persisting dichotomy (Tørstad and Sælen
2017) between rich (“Annex-I”) and poor (“Non-Annex-I”) countries. Our results stress
the importance of the status-quo on cooperative behavior. The analysis suggests that
starting with pre-existing mitigation levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. As
an important insight, falling behind the pre-determined status-quo builds a strong be-
havioral barrier. The vast majority of players tends to abstain from reversing existing
mitigation efforts.
Of course, our experimental setup reflects only one particular aspect of the global
stocktake as a review mechanism, namely its potential to affect players‘ cooperative
behavior via the status-quo. Our results thereby stress the sensitivity of overall cli-
mate mitigation efforts for this reference point. Poor and rich agents contribute around
30% of their disposable endowment to the climate account both in a setting with and
without pre-determined contribution levels. Consequently, a status-quo comprising
40% of the initial wealth resulting in an increase in overall ambition levels. The pos-
sibility to revise contributions later might have led to more ambitious contribution
levels initially (C2ES 2017). Given our results, the higher pre-determined contribution
levels might indeed result in more climate mitigation efforts. The robustness of this
finding against the background of different pre-existing contribution levels, provides
an avenue for future research. Finally, whether the global stocktake process fosters
the implementation of the Paris Agreement and increases overall climate actions will
also depend on a variety of different factors which we did not consider in our ex-
periment including, e.g., strategic behavior over multiple periods, sequential decision
making, and an open and non-anonymous discussion about targets and intentions.
This provides an interesting and important route for further research.
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Summary Statistics
Table 3: Summary statistics
Developed
(rich)
Developing
(poor)
GIVE GITA GIVE GITA
Mean contribution level 8.86 6.24 3.64 1.76
% of contributions < 0 - 7.00 - 16.00
% of contributions = 0 7.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
% of contributions > 0 93.00 91.00 100.00 84.00
% of endowment 29.53 20.80 36.40 17.60
% of disposable endowment 29.53 34.67 36.40 29.33
Mean provision level 8.86 18.24 3.64 5.76
Experimental design details
The material incentives for each agent i, pii, is given by the following equation:
pii = wti − ati + h(
n
∑
j=1
etj +
n
∑
j=1
atj).
Where wti is i’s endowment in treatment t,a
t
i ∈ Ati represents the transfer of i in treat-
ment t, Ati is the corresponding strategy set, h denotes the per capita return to the
public good with 0 < h < 1 < hn and eti is i’s initial allocation to the public good in
treatment t.We choose n = 4 and h = 0.4.
Agents in differ with respect to their initial endowment. Each group consists of two
rich agents and two poor agents. rich agents receive an initial endowment of 30 tokens
and poor agents, in contrast, receive an initial endowment of 10 tokens.
Our experiment design consists of two treatments summarized in Table 4. Treatments
differ in the initial allocation to the public good, eti , the initial endowment w
t
i , and the
corresponding actions set available Ati . We use a pure giving frame (GIVE) as baseline.
In this voluntary contribution mechanism, no initial allocations to the public good are
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Table 4: Experimental parameters
Endowment Initial cont. Action space
GIVE
poor wGIVEpoor = 10 eGIVEpoor = 0 aGIVEpoor ∈ [0, 10]
rich wGIVErich = 30 e
GIVE
rich = 0 a
GIVE
rich ∈ [0, 30]
GITA
poor wGITApoor = 10 eGITApoor = 4 aGITApoor ∈ [−4, 6]
rich wGITArich = 30 e
GITA
rich = 12 a
GITA
rich ∈ [−12, 18]
made (eGIVEpoor = eGIVErich = 0). Consequently, agents are endowed with w
GIVE
poor = 10 and
wGIVErich = 30 and have the following actions sets: a
GIVE
poor ∈ [0, 10] and aGIVErich ∈ [0, 30]. In
our second treatment, agents can either add to or subtract from the public good. In this
giving and taking (GITA) frame, both rich and poor agents made an initial contribution
of 40% of their endowment to the public good, i.e., eGITApoor = 4 and eGITArich = 12. In GITA,
the remaining endowments are given by wGITApoor = 6 and wGITArich = 18 and, consequently,
poor agents can decide on transfers between−4 and 6 tokens (aGITApoor ∈ [−4, 6]) and rich
agents between −12 and 18 tokens (aGIVErich ∈ [−12, 18]).
Instructions †
- Screen 1 -
Welcome!
Dear [Name], Thank you very much for your interest in contributing to our research. You can start the
Online-Study immediately. Prior to participating, please read through the most important information
briefly summarized here: - Participation will take no more than 10 minutes of your time. - The study
consists of both a decision task and a questionnaire. - You will receive detailed information on the
decision task during the study. - All explanations are carried out as described: By "money" we mean
real amounts of money which will be paid out. By other “participants” we mean real members of the
UNYANET network who participate in this study just like you. Note: Please always use the provided
buttons and not your internet browser for navigation. Otherwise a successful completion of the study
cannot be guaranteed. Please click "Next" to learn more about the expense allowance.
- Screen 2 -
†Explanatory notes are given in square brackets. Please note that we use braces to indicate the al-
ternative wording [DEVELOPED vs. DEVELOPING] and parameters [GIVE vs. GITA] used in the
different treatments.
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Your expense allowance consists of two parts: For each complete participation, UNYANET receives a
fixed amount of 2 US-Dollars. Additionally, an individual payment can be obtained in the decision task.
Whether you will receive the individual payment and how much you will get, depends on two factors:
(i) Your decision in the study as well as the decisions of other participants. (ii) After all participants have
made their decisions, we randomly select 10 percent of all participants who will receive their individual
payment. Please click "Next" to learn more about the decision task.
- Screen 3 -
We now start the explanation and the procedure of the decision task. Please carefully read through the
following instructions.
Explanation and procedure of the decision task
In this section, you have the chance to determine your individual payment. Who is involved in the
study? We create groups of four participants; in addition to you there are three other participants in
your group. Members of your group are from a variety of countries. We categorize countries according
to the Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme.
The HDI is a summary of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and
healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI divides countries into
four different groups. For our study, we classify countries of “very high human development” and “high
human development” as developed countries and we classify countries of “medium human develop-
ment” and “low human development” as developing countries. Like you one other participant is from
a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] country. The two remaining participants are,
in contrast, from [DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING: developed] countries.
The decision you will make affects both you and the other members of your group. Therefore, your
individual payment will be influenced by both your decision and the decisions of the other group mem-
bers. Please note, that all other members of your group possess exactly the same amount of information
and face the same decision as you do.
What is the decision task? During the study your individual payment is calculated in tokens. Sub-
sequently to the study your payment will be converted from tokens into US-Dollars at the following
exchange rate:
1 Token = 1.5 US $ [adjusted for purchasing power parity]
Please note, the value of one token is the same in all countries. [GIVE: In this decision task, you and the
other member of your group from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] country
possess an initial endowment of [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10] tokens in a private account.
The two remaining participants from [DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING: developed] coun-
tries possess, in contrast, an initial endowment of [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10] tokens in
their private accounts. Your task is to decide on the transfer of tokens between your private account
and the group account: That is how many of the [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10] tokens in your
private account you transfer to the group account. You will be asked to indicate your transfer on a
slider as shown below. If you move the slider to the right, you decide to transfer tokens from your
private account to the group account. Please note, your transfer can be between 0 and [DEVELOPED:
30] [DEVELOPING: 10] tokens (only integer numbers).] [GITA: In this decision task, you and the other
member of your group from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] country possess
17
Appendix
an initial endowment of [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] tokens in a private account. The two re-
maining participants from [DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING: developed] countries possess,
in contrast, an initial endowment of [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] tokens in their private ac-
counts. In addition, there are 32 tokens in a joint group account shared by all members of your group.
Your task is to decide on the transfer of tokens between your private account and the group account:
That is how many of the [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] in your private account you transfer to
the group account and how many of the 32 tokens you leave in the group account respectively. Your
transfer is related to the group account as described below: A positive transfer is a transfer of tokens
from your private account to the group account. Respectively, a negative transfer is a transfer of tokens
from the group account to your private account. You will be asked to indicate your transfer on a slider
as shown below. If you move the slider to the left, you decide to transfer tokens from the group account
to your private account (negative transfer). If you move the slider to the right, you decide to transfer
tokens from your private account to the group account (positive transfer). Please note, you are from
a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] country and your transfer can be between
[DEVELOPED: -12] [DEVELOPING: -4] and [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] tokens (only in-
teger numbers). Participants from [DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING: developed] countries
can transfer [DEVELOPED: -4] [DEVELOPING: -12] and [DEVELOPED: -12] [DEVELOPING: -4] and
[DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] [DEVELOPED: 6] [DEVELOPING: 18] tokens (only integer num-
bers).]
How do the accounts differ from each other? Your individual payment depends on your decision as
well as on the decisions of the other three group members according to the rules explained below. You
receive a payment from tokens in your private account and you and the other three group members
receive a payment from tokens in the group account. Private account: It’s only you who can trans-
fer tokens from your private account to the group account or vice versa. For every token which is in
your private account, you will receive 1 token. The other three group members do not receive any pay-
ment from your private account. However, every participant equally owns a respective private account.
Group account: Apart from you, the other three group members can also transfer tokens from their
private account to the joint group account. For every token which is in the group account, you and the
other three group members will receive a payment of 0.4 tokens. Your total individual payment consists,
consequently, of two parts: Part one: the amount of tokens in your private account, and Part two: the
payment from the group account.
- Screen 4 -
Examples
Before deciding on your transfer, this page will provide you with two examples of different transfers
and how these decisions affect payments.
Example 1: [GIVE: Assume you are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVEL-
OPING: developing] country. You decide on a transfer of 2 tokens from your private account to the
group account. Participants B decides to transfer 2 tokens from its private account to the group account.
C decides to transfer 3 tokens and D decides to transfer 1 token. The group account now contains 8
(2+2+3+1) tokens. According to the rules, this amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all group mem-
bers benefit equally from it. Consequently, everybody receives 3.2 tokens from the group account. Your
total individual payment is given by your initial endowment minus your transfer plus the payment
from the group account: [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10]-2+3.2= [DEVELOPED: 31.2] [DEVEL-
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OPING: 11.2].] [GITA: Assume you are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DE-
VELOPING: developing] country. You decide on a transfer of 2 tokens from your private account to the
group account. Participants B decides to transfer 2 tokens from its private account to the group account.
C decides to transfer 3 tokens and D decides to transfer 1 token. The group account now contains 40
(32+2+2+3+1) tokens. According to the rules, this amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all group
members benefit equally from it. Consequently, everybody receives 16 tokens from the group account.
Your total individual payment is given by your initial endowment minus your transfer plus the pay-
ment from the group account: developed [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] - 2+16= [DEVELOPED:
32] [DEVELOPING: 20] tokens.]
Example 2: [GIVE: Assume you are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVEL-
OPING: developing] country. You decide on a transfer of 6 tokens from your private account to the
group account. Participants B decides to transfer 2 tokens from its private account to the group ac-
count. C decides to transfer 3 tokens and D decides to transfer 1 token. The group account now con-
tains 12 (6+2+3+1) tokens. According to the rules, this amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all
group members benefit equally from it. Consequently, everybody receives 4.8 tokens from the group ac-
count. Your total individual payment is given by your initial endowment minus your transfer plus the
payment from the group account: [DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10]-6+4.8= [DEVELOPED: 28.8]
[DEVELOPING: 8.8].] [GITA: Assume you are Participant A. You are from a [DEVELOPED: developed]
[DEVELOPING: developing] country. You decide on a transfer of 2 tokens from the group account to
your private account. Participants B decides to transfer 2 tokens from its private account to the group
account. C decides to transfer 3 tokens and D decides to transfer 1 token. The group account now con-
tains 36 (32-2+2+3+1) tokens. According to the rules, this amount of tokens is multiplied by 0.4 and all
group members benefit equally from it. Consequently, everybody receives 14.4 tokens from the group
account. Your total individual payment is given by your initial endowment minus your transfer plus
the payment from the group account: [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] -(-2)+14.4= [DEVELOPED:
34.4] [DEVELOPING: 22.4] tokens.]
- Screen 5 -
Contribution Decision
[GIVE: At this stage, you now have to decide upon your transfer. Please note, that the other members
of your international group also indicate their decisions. You have [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVEL-
OPING: developing] tokens in your private account. Please indicate the amount of tokens you want
to transfer: 0-[DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10].] [GITA: At this stage, you now have to decide
upon your transfer. Please note, that the other members of your international group also indicate their
decisions. The group account contains 32 tokens and you have [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] in
your private account. Note again, any negative transfer between [DEVELOPED: -12] [DEVELOPING:
-4] tokens and -1 is a transfer from the public account to your private account. Accordingly, any posit-
ive transfer between 0 and [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] tokens is a transfer from your private
account to the public account.] Confirm: Please confirm your choice by clicking “Next”.
- Screen 6 -
Belief Group 1: Irrespective of your own decision: What do you think is the transfer chosen by the
other group member from a [DEVELOPED: developed] [DEVELOPING: developing] country? [GIVE:
Please indicate the amount of tokens 0-[DEVELOPED: 30] [DEVELOPING: 10].] [GITA: Note again, any
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negative transfer between [DEVELOPED: -12] [DEVELOPING: -4] and -1 is a transfer from the public
account to the private account. Accordingly, any positive transfer between 0 and [DEVELOPED: 18]
[DEVELOPING: 6] is a transfer from the private account to the public account.]
Belief Group 2: Irrespective of your own decision: What do you think is the transfer chosen by the
other group members from [DEVELOPED: developing] [DEVELOPING: developed] countries? [GIVE:
Please indicate the amount of tokens 0-[DEVELOPED: 10] [DEVELOPING: 30].] [GITA: Note again, any
negative transfer between [DEVELOPED: -4] [DEVELOPING: -12] and -1 is a transfer from the public
account to the private account. Accordingly, any positive transfer between 0 and [DEVELOPED: 6]
[DEVELOPING: 18] is a transfer from the private account to the public account.]
- Screen 7 -
Please use the following scale to indicate how much you agree with the following statement: To me, the
decision task was easy to understand. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly
agree O No answer
- Screen 8 -
Please use the following scale to indicate how you classify yourself: In general, are you rather risk
seeking or do you avoid to be exposed to risk? 0 (risk-averse) to 5 (prepared to take risks) O 1 O 2 O 3 O
4 O 5 O No answer
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people? O Most people can be trusted O You need to be very careful O No answer
- Screen 9 -
Please indicate for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between, using this scale:
a) Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled. O Never justifiable O Mostly not justifi-
able O Neutral O Mostly justifiable O Always justifiable O No answer
b) Avoiding a fare on public transport. O Never justifiable O Mostly not justifiable O Neutral O Mostly
justifiable O Always justifiable O No answer
c) Cheating on taxes if you have a chance. O Never justifiable O Mostly not justifiable O Neutral O
Mostly justifiable O Always justifiable O No answer
- Screen 10 -
Please classify the area where you grew up. O Big city O Small city O Rural village O No answer
People see themselves and how they relate to the world differently. Using this scale, can you indicate
how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?
a) I see myself as a world citizen. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree
O No answer
b) I see myself as part of the [home country] nation. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree
O Strongly agree O No answer
c) I see myself as an autonomous individual. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O
Strongly agree O No answer
- Screen 11 -
If you use the following products or services, do you use them to contact people living in other parts of
your country, or also people living in other countries?
a) Postal mail. O Local area O Other parts of my country O Other countries O No answer
b) Phone. O Local area O Other parts of my country O Other countries O No answer
c) Internet. O Local area O Other parts of my country O Other countries O No answer
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Consider the following geographical areas. How often do you travel, either for work or for vacation, in
each of them?
a) To other countries within my continent. O Every week O Every month O Every year O Less often O
Never O No answer
b) To other countries outside my continent. O Every week O Every month O Every year O Less often O
Never O No answer
How often do you do the following activity?
a) Watch a television program or movie from a different country. O Every day O Every week O Less
often O Never O I do not have access O No answer
b) Watch or listen to an international news source (CNN International, BBC World, Euronews, etc.). O
Every day O Every week O Less often O Never O I do not have access O No answer
c) Read an international news source (Time, The Economist, Le Monde, etc.). O Every day O Every week
O Less often O Never O I do not have access O No answer
- Screen 12 -
Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? O Roman Catholic O Protestant O Othodox
(Russian/Greek/etc.) O JEW O Muslim O Hindu O Buddhist O Do not belong to denomination O
Other:
Please use the following scale to indicate how religious you are (1: not religious at all, 5: very religious).
O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O No answer
- Screen 13 -
Please use the following scale to indicate how important it is for you to own a piece of land (1: not
important at all, 5: very important). O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O No answer
Please use the following scale to indicate how important it is for you to maintain small species at the
Amazon forest in South America (1: not important at all, 5: very important). O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O No
answer
Using this scale, can you indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following state-
ments concerning principles underlying potential rules to allocate climate change mitigation costs across
countries:
a) Countries with high income levels must pay a larger share of the costs than countries with low income
levels. This option says that countries with greater ability to pay should pay more. O Strongly disagree
O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
b) Countries with currently high emissions levels must pay a larger share of the costs than countries
with currently low emission levels. This option says that those countries that are currently polluting
more should pay more. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No
answer
c) Countries with a history of high emissions levels must pay a larger share of the costs than countries
with a history of low emissions. This option recognizes that CO2 builds up in the atmosphere over many
years. Thus, countries which polluted more in the past should pay more because they caused more of
the problem. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly agree O No answer
d) Countries with emissions per person greater than an agreed amount must pay, and they must pay
more the higher their emission per person are. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O
Strongly agree O No answer
e) Each country shall reduce its emissions by an equal percentage rate. That is, a countries’ overall share
in global emissions remains constant. O Strongly disagree O Disagree O Neutral O Agree O Strongly
agree O No answer
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- Screen 14 -
Using this scale, can you indicate how important the following global challenges are in your opinion:
a) International efforts in combating climate change. O Very important O Important O Neutral O Mod-
erately important O Not important O No answer
b) Securing world nutrition and eradicating poverty. O Very important O Important O Neutral O Mod-
erately important O Not important O No answer
c) Combating epidemics. O Very important O Important O Neutral O Moderately important O Not
important O No answer
d) Stabilizing the international financial system. O Very important O Important O Neutral O Moderately
important O Not important O No answer
e) Combating terrorism. O Very important O Important O Neutral O Moderately important O Not
important O No answer
- Screen 15 -
What comes next? After all participants have made their decisions, the ZEW research team will screen
all decisions. To support the activities of your network, UNYANET will receive 2 US-Dollars for each
participant. Furthermore, 10 percent of all participants will be randomly selected and receive their
individual payment. If you have been selected, you will be informed via email subsequently to the
study.
- Screen 16 -
Did you enjoy taking part in this study and do you want to participate in other scientific studies of this
type? We would be pleased to add your name to our member database and would be happy to invite
you to further studies. As a matter of course, your data are not used for any other purposes. If you wish
to withdraw your participation offer at any point of time, your data will be directly unsubscribed from
the database. Please click on "Yes", to add your name to our database.
- Screen 17 -
Thank you for your time and support! Do you have any questions left? Our research team would be glad
to help you. Do not hesitate to contact: onlinestudy@zew.de. Please note details concerning the research
agenda and the results of the study will be circulated among all registered persons subsequently to the
study
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